

DCI/IC 75-0317

14 February 1975

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Documents

1. On 12 February 1975, Bill Harris called requesting additional information and documents be forwarded to him via courier to the PFIAB vault. He specifically asked for the following:

a. Additional charts, beyond those sent to him on 7 February, of the Intelligence Community, reflecting the process, product, nervous system, etc.

b. A "list of lost or compromised collection efforts through press disclosure . . . " both classified and unclassified, that he might use to write a legal brief to support the DCI's pending "sources and methods" legislation.

c. A paper prepared in OGC by Mr. Cary via John Warner on the legality of most CS activities.

2. I have prepared a package of material that includes those items identified above and have arranged for a courier to drop them off at the PFIAB vault on Friday, 14 February, if you approve.

3. Reference paragraph 1a above, the charts in which Harris has an interest are listed below. Please indicate Yes/No on each:

a. Outline of a National Warning and Crisis Operations Structure.

b. Current Organization of Crisis Warning Structure.

c. Proposed Organization of Crisis Warning Structure.

d. Intelligence Community from a collection, processing and product perspective.

e. Growth of the Intelligence Community from 1941-1969.

25X1 4. [] suggested that his paper on National Attitudes Toward Intelligence and the charts that accompany it, could be sent as well.

5. Reference paragraph 1b above, attached is a draft letter that could be sent to Harris. The portion of the letter dealing with leaks was provided by [] of the 25X1A Security Committee.

6. Reference paragraph 1c above. The OCG paper is attached.

[]
Captain, USAF
DCI/ICS/CS

25X1

Attachments: As Stated

(INTEL COMMUNITY STAFF
LETTERHEAD)

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D R A F T/14Feb75/JWL:hcd

Mr. William R. Harris
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Bill:

Thank you for sending over the draft all source paper. It is an excellent study and one which I am sure will have many uses.

You asked for some additional material to support the Commission's investigation and the attached ought to answer much of your request of 13 February 1975.

One particular subject, however, needs more explanation. As I understand it, you would like to have a list of lost or compromised collection efforts through press disclosure. There is nothing current in the files of the USIB Security Committee which would satisfy your request.

Actually, there is no such listing any place which compiles all leaks. The CIA Office of Security did initiate a program to establish a leak data base in 1972 but its records consist of submissions or notices of possible unauthorized disclosure prepared by CIA operational components. The concept was never extended throughout the community. As things now stand each USIB Principal is responsible for investigating any unauthorized disclosure within his

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department or agency. Only in rare cases are the results of the investigations reported to the Board through the USIB Security Committee. And these cases are of a nature that would not permit declassification or inclusion in a report you are preparing.

While we would like to help you, there are a couple of things that militate against embarking on an exercise aimed at working up a study for you.

First, based on experience we can say that expectations are slight of preparing even a few unclassified hard-hitting examples of the damage done by leaks.

Second, quite candidly, we do not believe that members of the Community would care to reveal live sources who have been turned off because of leaks.

Third, there is the imponderable problem of adverse effects on the future willingness of an individual to cooperate with us or of a foreign government to provide us with intelligence materials when leaks demonstrate a questionable ability on our part to keep "secrets" secret.

Fourth, in the area of our technical collection, while there is a universal conviction that leaks contribute to countermeasures adopted by the targets, we have not found how to measure or quantify the loss directly attributable

to leaks as opposed to what may be considered simple improved security practices of the target. An attempt was made some months ago to study the problem of evaluating results of unauthorized disclosures. After serious review of a few selected cases which we felt must have harmed technical sources and methods, we found that we were unable to accurately weigh the damages in terms of dollar loss to the US because countermeasures were implemented which reduced the effectiveness and thus the value of expensive collection programs.


How do we value any volume of intelligence no longer available because of effective countermeasures? How do we know what we can no longer see because of camouflage or underground construction, and how do we tell if this was instituted primarily because of leaks? What are we no longer able to intercept because of a switch from wireless transmission to ground lines, and was the switch stimulated because of an unauthorized disclosure or introduced in the course of a planned security improvement? Good questions, but there aren't any answers.

For these reasons we do not believe that we can provide you with any material of a supportive nature in the treatment of the evils of leaks. For whatever value it may lend, we are providing an unclassified expression of concern about unauthorized disclosures which was issued to the community last year by the DCI. It reflects the reasons for our

concern and also proposes individual responsibilities in the prevention of unauthorized disclosures.

I hope the attached material will help you. If we can be of any more assistance, please call.

Sincerely,



Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

25X1A

Attachments:

(SEE PROPOSED LIST OF ATTACHMENTS -
FOLLOWING PAGE)

Attachments:

a. Charts:

- (1) Outline of a National Warning and Crisis Operations Structure
- (2) Current Organization of Crisis Warning Structure
- (3) Proposed Organization of Crisis Warning Structure
- (4) Intelligence Community from a Collection, Processing and Product Perspective
- (5) Growth of the Intelligence Community from 1941-1969

b. "The Use of Classical Espionage, Electronic Surveillance and Covert Action Under International Law and Pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief and Foreign Affairs Powers of the President," February 1975

c. "National Attitudes Toward Intelligence," (Draft), with 5 charts: Intelligence Techniques; Intelligence Techniques in Russia; Intelligence Techniques, US Pre WW I; Intelligence Techniques, US WW I to WW II; Intelligence Techniques, US WW II and Since

d. "Civil Litigation Involving Victor L. Marchetti"

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Soviet-Chinese Clashes Forecast

**By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten**

Looking ahead to the end of the century, a blue-ribbon commission anticipates an uneasy world of Russian-Chinese clashes, lesser military conflicts, acute hunger and nagging depression.

The draft study, circulated only in confidential, numbered copies, is called "The Future World Environment." We have obtained a text.

The commission, selected jointly by Presidents Nixon and Ford and Senate-House leaders, includes such prestigious members as Vice President Rockefeller, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and House foreign experts Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.) and Peter Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.). The chairman is former Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy.

"A confrontation between Russia and China, possibly involving limited armed clashes, dominates world politics," the secret study forecasts.

"War becomes a major instrument of policy in countries of the Third World," the study adds. "Some U.S. interventions occur, most likely in Caribbean, possibly in Latin America, (with) military units of 40,000 or larger, resembling occupation armies."

A tortured approval of the "militarization of India (and) collapse of Indian democracy," it is predicted, "under the

weight of the food/population crisis, leading to Indian aggression against Pakistan and perhaps some oil states."

Despite these dark war clouds, the study predicts that long-range nuclear weapons will be sharply curtailed and nuclear warfare between the superpowers, therefore, will be averted.

But this will make the world "safe" for conventional warfare, thus increasing the "chances of Soviet pre-emptive strike against China and of war between Western and Communist powers" as the danger to the civilian population decreases.

During this anxious era, the United States will gradually reestablish control over Europe, the panel predicts, until Europe becomes "more a peninsula than a power." The Soviets, in turn, will dominate the Middle East while China controls "Southeast Asia, makes headway in Africa and makes trouble in India."

Internally, "the U.S.S.R. will be subject to growing pressures" and the future of China without Mao Tse-tung "is unpredictable." However, "the turnover in governments everywhere is likely to be unusually rapid."

As a New Year's prediction 10 years from now, the American "presidential leadership will be taxed to the utmost . . . Public opinion will assume greater importance." The commission concludes that the public will support the President's predicted call for moderate sacri-

fices, somewhat to the discomfort of Congress.

Eventually, the dollar will be reestablished, the study says, "as the world's major reserve and trading currency." But this will not prevent a continuing spiral in costs of food, oil and other necessities.

In fact, these distinguished crystal-ball gazers see "starvation in some regions," rampant unemployment around the world and, in the more developed lands "a rapid, worldwide rise in wage levels" as a result of inflation.

The 12-page summary, collected from both expert testimony and staff research, makes clear that some of the predictions are more probable than others. Chairman Murphy hopes to submit the final version to President Ford and Congress by June, 1975.

Footnote: The commission's research director, Peter Szanton, insisted to our reporter Ira Rosen that the secret study was still preliminary. But he said it contained the "raw material" for the final, more comprehensive study.

CIA Whispers—The Central Intelligence Agency secretly provided the Justice Department with confidential information on numerous Americans for "anti-riot" purposes during the Nixon years.

The strange deal was arranged at a meeting between a high Justice Department official and a CIA representative, even though the CIA is barred

from domestic surveillance by federal law.

During the past several days, the press has revealed one violation after another of this stricture. But little has been written about the use of CIA data by other agencies such as the FBI and Secret Service.

Two years ago, we reported that the CIA had provided the Secret Service with sex gossip about singer Eartha Kitt after she made an unfavorable remark about the Vietnam war at a White House luncheon. We omitted her name because we were unable to reach her to get permission to quote what the secret CIA report said about her.

Richard M. Helms, then the CIA director, personally assured us that the Eartha Kitt report was an exception and that the CIA had uncovered information about her in the course of an overseas investigation.

But we have now learned that the CIA funneled information through the FBI to the Justice Department's civil disturbance unit about hundreds of active or potential demonstrators. The information was requested by the Justice Department, which turned over 9,000 names to the CIA for checking against Americans who had attended overseas peace conferences.

The CIA's role in furnishing information about potential demonstrators was confirmed by a senior Justice Department official and a former assistant attorney general, whose names we agreed to omit.

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9 January 1975

Fisher Howe has asked that Mr. Colby provide him with an imaginative Personnel Officer acquainted with some of the intricate experiences of the CIA Career Management System. The purpose is to join with officers from other agencies to review personnel management in a broad context for foreign policy. The contribution of the CIA Personnel man is therefore much more universally broad government personnel management systems than CIA alone. The person should have some appreciation for planning such systems. It is unlikely that this group will focus on the cover picture per se or indeed the technical details of any particular system or approach except as these may lead to some modifications or improvements that could be recommended in a broad generic sense.

During the Director's briefing, he impressed the Commissioners with the need for U.S. Government agencies in the foreign policy field to recognize their intelligence role including providing appropriate

25X1 [redacted] I sense the Commission is prepared to comment and support the Director in that view. It is my impression that we would benefit from having a role in guiding the Commission's consideration of this broad foreign policy focus. I have recommended to the Director that he seriously weigh in and provide a person for the few days required.

[redacted]

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DCI/IC-75-0506

Mr. Fisher Howe
Deputy Executive Director
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Fisher:

Enclosed are the charts we talked about on Tuesday,
7 January. Although they show only broad trends, they
should still be considered as Secret.

I very much enjoyed our visit and will look forward
to seeing the paper that your hard work is going to pro-
duce.


Sincerely,


Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community


25X1A

Enclosure: as stated

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(8 Jan 77)

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DCI/IC 74-2415

19 December 1974

Mr. Fisher Howe
Deputy Executive Director
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Fisher:

Here are the five documents that [] promised to you during his briefing on Monday, 16 December: 25X1A

1. A current draft of a proposed Omnibus NSCID. This draft is in coordination and subject to change.
2. USIB/IRAC Memorandum, subject: "Economic Intelligence -- An Action Program;"
3. Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980;
4. Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975; and,
5. Reviews of the book "The KGB." *in Murphy file*

The first four are furnished to the Commission for background purposes and are not to be cited in any public documents.

I enjoyed our session and will be happy to provide any other assistance you may need.

Sincerely,

[]

Coordination Staff, Intelligence
Community Staff

Attachments
As stated

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DCI/IC/CS/S [redacted] is (12/18/74)
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Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee, w/atts.

1 - IC Registry

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25X1A

(1) [redacted]

Fisher Howe Chalk-Talk 1/7/75

1. The Community
 vast technical
 complex costly
 secret
2. Facts of Life
 1. Past reports (such as Schlesinger study)
 2. Present spotlight
 secrecy-purposes-abuses
 3. Probable futures
 military outlook
 other forces
 institutions
 resources/energy
 food/population
 environment
3. What Counts?

<u>Collection</u>	Production
-- Responsiveness	
-- Economy of effort	
...	
-- Direction and Oversight	
-- Security vs Openness	
-- (Covert activity)	
4. Responsiveness
 - A. Priorities
 --military/economic
 - B. All Other
 --policy/intelligence--understanding responsibilities
 --division of labor
 --economic and scientific intelligence
 --NIEs
 --Net assessments
 What is needed? Responsibility
 authority (too much military)
5. Economy of Effort
 - A. Priorities
 - B. Excess

The Budget
What is needed? Responsibility
 Authority
 (DCI has responsibility for achieving economy of
 effort but does not have authority. This should
 flow from the President)

6. Direction and Oversight
Qualities of DCI
Executive oversight
Legislative oversight
7. Security and Openness
Protection of sources
Law and conformity to law
Openness
8. Covert Action
Capability
Organization
Control
Covert
10. SO?
 1. What authority over the Community?
 2. What authority for the DCI?

NOTE: Fisher Howe suggested some of the following options for strengthening the DCI's authority.

1. Present system (reinforced by Presidential statement)
2. Procedural changes--national tasking by DCI
3. Joint authority with OMB
4. Create Excom to oversee NSA comparable to NRO
5. Change executive agents

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DCI/IC-75-0504
07 JAN 1975

Mr. Fisher Howe
Deputy Executive Director
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Fisher:

Here is a review of the book, KGB, which will
appear in the new Studies in Intelligence. I
thought you might find it useful.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Coordination Staff, Intelligence
Community Staff

Enclosure: as stated

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1 - [Redacted] Chrono

DCI/ICS, [Redacted]
(7 January 75)

[Redacted Box]

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